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MONEY TALKS: USING PRIOR SALARY AS AN AFFIRMATIVE 





The wage gap is alive and well, with women on average making 82 
cents for every dollar a man makes. Moreover, the wage gap has 
stagnated, with no significant progress being made to close the gap for the 
past ten years. In light of this stagnation, it is important to review current 
practices and consider steps that could be taken in order to catalyze a 
modern effort at closing the wage gap. One commonplace business 
practice that should be addressed is an employer’s use of an employee’s 
prior salary to determine starting pay. Courts are divided as to whether 
employers can or should be allowed, under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, to 
rely on an employee’s past salary to excuse any resulting wage differential 
between employees of the opposite sex performing substantially similar 
work. 
This Note argues that, within the context of the Equal Pay Act, 
employers should not be able to excuse a wage gap by using an employee’s 
prior salary. This Note proceeds by examining the history and current 
context of the Equal Pay Act of 1963, as well as the disparate court 
responses concerning whether employers can use their considerations of 
an employee’s prior salary to defend a resulting wage gap. This Note finds 
that, while prior salary may appear to be an objective measure that helps 
facilitate setting current wages, prior salary is ultimately some third-
party’s determination of a person’s worth. Prior salary is a shadowy 
concept and it is extraordinarily difficult, if not outright impossible, to 
discern what factors may have been used in setting it and whether that 
determination was at all prejudicial. Therefore, this Note ultimately urges 
courts and legislatures to recognize that prior salary should not be used 
to excuse a wage gap. People’s livelihoods are at risk and it is important 
that the question of whether prior salary should continue to be considered 
and used as a defense by employers be resolved.  
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In the United States, Equal Pay Day is a day of awareness, symbolic of the fact 
that women are paid less than men. It typically falls within the first or second week 
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of April,1 denoting the additional amount of time women must work into the new 
year to earn what men earned during the previous year.2 On the eve of Equal Pay 
Day in April 2018, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit released its en 
banc decision in Rizo v. Yovino.3 The court held that under the Equal Pay Act of 
1963 (EPA)4—a means to ensure equal pay for equal work—“prior salary alone or 
in combination with other factors cannot justify a wage differential.”5 That is, 
employers can no longer use prior salary to justify a wage gap in an EPA claim 
brought by an employee for wage discrimination.6 Inconsistent with holdings in 
other circuits, Rizo highlights the existing circuit split concerning prior salary and 
the EPA.7  
In 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated Rizo because Judge Reinhardt, who 
authored the Ninth Circuit decision and cast the majority vote, died 11 days before 
the decision was issued and “the Ninth Circuit erred in counting him as a member 
of the majority.”8 Although the decision has been vacated, Rizo is nonetheless 
exemplary of the steps that need to be taken to catalyze a modern effort at closing 
the wage gap, attaining equal pay for equal work9 between men and women in the 
United States.10 
                                               
1 In 2018, Equal Pay Day for women in general was April 10, but Equal Pay Day fell 
on February 22 for Asian women, April 17 for white, non-Hispanic women, August 7 for 
black women, September 27 for Native American women, and November 1 for Latinas. 
Equal Pay Days, EQUAL PAY TODAY (2018), http://www.equalpaytoday.org/equalpaydays/ 
[https://perma.cc/M5SA-WXYR]. 
2 Tristan Sullivan-Wilson, Equal Pay Day 2018: Ending Secrecy to Close the Gender 
Wage Gap and Fight Sexual Harassment, NAT’L. WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://nwlc.org/blog/equal-pay-day-2018-ending-secrecy-to-close-the-gender-wage-gap-
and-fight-sexual-harassment/ [https://perma.cc/ADQ7-ZXNR]. 
3 Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc), vacated per curiam on other 
grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019).  
4 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). See infra Part III for discussion of the Equal Pay Act 
of 1963. 
5 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 456. 
6 See infra Part III. 
7 See infra Part III.C for discussion of different interpretations in appellate case law. 
8 Yovino v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706, 710 (2019) (“[F]ederal judges are appointed for life, 
not for eternity.”). In a per curiam decision, the Supreme Court noted that “[w]ithout Judge 
Reinhardt’s vote, the opinion attributed to him would have been approved by only 5 of the 
10 members of the en banc panel who were still living when the decision was filed. Although 
the other five living judges concurred in the judgment, they did so for different reasons . . . 
Judge Reinhardt’s vote made a difference.” Id. at 708.  
9 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2018) (“The equal work standard does not require that 
compared jobs be identical, only that they be substantially equal.”). 
10 This Note uses the term “wage gap” to refer to a gap in pay median between working 
men and women in the United States. The Bureau of Labor Statistics is the government 
agency that reports these statistics using gender binary metrics. As such, this Note does not 
address wages of gender-nonconforming individuals.  
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Ultimately, this Note contends that Rizo v. Yovino was correctly decided, 
embodying the reformative spirit necessary to close the wage gap and end the need 
for Equal Pay Day. Part II of this Note considers the evolution and current status of 
the wage gap for women in the United States. Part III looks to the Equal Pay Act of 
1963, reviewing: (A) the procedural application; (B) the history and intent behind 
its enactment, focusing on the fourth affirmative defense as enumerated in the EPA, 
which employers may exercise in response to an EPA claim; (C) case law addressing 
instances where prior salary was used as an affirmative defense in EPA claims; and 
(D) the EPA’s current status in the U.S. Lastly, Part IV argues that decisions like 
Rizo, although narrow in effect, could have a broad impact, helping to drive 
proactive responses and reform, which are necessary to close the wage gap.  
 
II.  THE WAGE GAP 
 
Women in the United States have historically been paid less than men due to 
sexist economic policies and social beliefs.11 “In 1955, women workers’ median 
income was 64% of that of men workers; in 1960, the median women’s wage was 
only 61% of that of men,”12 and in 1961, women earned only 59% of what men 
made.13 In response to this persisting differential, “equal pay legislation [was] 
                                               
11 See Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 1869), https://timesmachine.nytimes. 
com/timesmachine/1869/02/18/79386020.pdf [https://perma.cc/98QK-TYB5] (noting that 
women employed by the government as clerks “earn about one-half the average salary paid 
to men clerks . . . engaged in the same kinds of labor . . .”); see also Rizo v. Yovino, 887 
F.3d 453, 568 (9th Cir. 2018) (en banc), vacated per curiam on other grounds, 139 S. Ct. 
706 (2019) (noting that the wage gap is not some “inert historical relic of bygone assumptions 
and sex-based oppression.”); Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 191–94 (1974) 
(noting that men who worked night shifts were paid more than women who could only work 
day shifts because women were prohibited by state law from working night shifts); 109 
CONG. REC. 9192, 9199 (1963) (statement of Rep. Green) (citing studies in which 
“employers . . . said they had a double standard pay scale for men and women . . . with the 
wage for women always the lower”). 
12 109 CONG. REC. 9192, 9199–9200 (statement of Rep. Dwyer). 
13 Id. at 9199 (statement of Rep. Green) (stating that “[i]n 1961 the median income for 
women workers was $3,351, while the median income for men workers was $5,655. . . .”). 
These figures and statistics likely come from the U.S. Census Bureau since the U.S. Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) only has comparable earnings data available starting in 1979. 
See Frequently asked questions about earnings data from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (June 28, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/cps/earnings-
faqs.htm [https://perma.cc/BUB4-X6R3]. Any differences between the statistics from the 
Census Bureau and BLS may be due to BLS using “median usual weekly earnings” data and 
the Census Bureau using “median annual earnings” data. Id. This Note uses statistics from 
the BLS when available. 
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introduced in every Congress [from] 1945”14 until the passage of the EPA in 1963.15 
In 1979, seven years after the EPA was expanded to include all workers16 and the 
first year for which the Bureau of Labor Statistics has published comparable 
earnings data,17 women earned 62% of what men earned.18 In 2017, the median 
salary for women was 82% of what men earned that year.19 While the wage gap has 
narrowed by about 0.5 percentage points per year since 1979, there has been very 
little progress since the early 2000s, with the differential stagnating around 80–
83%.20 Although the calculated wage gap does increase or decrease if factors such 
as race, age, occupation, location, or motherhood are controlled for, the average 
woman in the United States21 makes 82 cents for every dollar a man makes.22  
There is a presumption among wage gap skeptics that if women are being paid 
less, there must be a rational explanation. For example, some skeptics may attempt 
to explain away the wage gap as simply “statistics gone awry,” women choosing 
flexibility over larger salaries, or discounting influential factors like education and 
                                               
14 109 CONG. REC., at 9193 (statement of Rep. Bolton).  
15 Equal pay legislation also reemerged with the passage of Title VII of the Equal Rights 
Act in 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e–2(a)) and the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act in 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(2009) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 626, 633a, 794a; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a note, 
2000e-5, 2000e-16). Additionally, if passed, the Paycheck Fairness Act would help clarify 
the EPA. See, e.g., How the Paycheck Fairness Act Will Strengthen the Equal Pay Act, WORK 
PLACE JUSTICE, NAT’L. WOMEN’S L. CTR. (2017), https://nwlc.org/resources/how-the-
paycheck-fairness-act-will-strengthen-the-equal-pay-act/ [https://perma.cc/EHL6-285Z]. 
The Paycheck Fairness Act is a proposed amendment to the EPA which was first introduced 
in 1997 and has been reintroduced in every session since. See, e.g., H.R. 2023, 105th Cong. 
(1997). 
16 The EPA originally excluded certain categories of workers because it was enacted as 
an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, and all of the exemptions applied until the 
act was amended in 1972. See H.R. REP. No. 88-309, 8 (1963) (“All of the fair labor standards 
exemptions apply: Agriculture, hotels, motels, restaurants, and laundries are excluded. Also, 
all professional, managerial, and administrative personnel, and outside salesmen are 
excluded.”); see also Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(1), 86 
Stat. 375 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (2012)) (removing § 206(d)(1) from 
exemption). 
17 U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., REP. NO. 1075, HIGHLIGHTS OF WOMEN’S EARNINGS IN 
2017, 1 (Aug. 2018), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-earnings/2017/pdf/home. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/7PJ7-YXX3] [hereinafter BLS HIGHLIGHTS]. 
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 1–2. 
21 The statistics referenced in this Note concerning the wage gap are based on surveys 
of wage and salaried workers ages 16 and older working 35 hours or more per week. See id.  
22 Id. Statistics can also vary based on how pay is measured, for example, hourly 
compared to weekly. See Nikki Graf et al., The narrowing, but persistent, gender gap in pay, 
PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 22, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/09/gender-
pay-gap-facts/ [https://perma.cc/268U-EXVG].  
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experience.23 In other words, if women are being paid less, they somehow deserve 
it by way of their independent choices––“unequal work, hence unequal pay.”24 But 
this view ignores the compounding effects of history in addition to the fact that even 
when factors like education, occupation, and location are controlled for, an 
unexplainable differential still exists.25  
The wage gap endures in all states26 and persists at all economic levels.27 
Moreover, the wage gap is not projected to close until 2059, and that is only if 
progress continues at the current rate, narrowing by 0.5 percentage points each 
year.28 To prevent the permanent stagnation of the wage gap, it is imperative to 
remain active and proactive, with ongoing efforts to achieve wage equality between 
men and women in the workforce. The trajectory offered by the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in Rizo v. Yovino is one such encouraging attempt at a more equal economic 
                                               
23 Rachel Greszler, “Pay Gap” Myth Ignores Women’s Intentional Job Choices, 
HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/ 
pay-gap-myth-ignores-womens-intentional-job-choices [https://perma.cc/8SZ5-E5WH]; see 
also Hanna Rosin, The Gender Wage Gap Lie, SLATE (Aug. 30, 2013), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/08/gender_pay_gap_the_familiar_lin
e_that_women_make_77_cents_to_every_man_s.html [https://perma.cc/E3BT-GQYB]; 
Jimmy Kimmel Live, Kids Explain Why Women Are Paid Less Than Men, YOUTUBE (Mar. 
25, 2016), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=S1Onniy08AY [https://perma.cc/G5BW-
BTVW]. 
24 Bourree Lam, What Gender Pay Gap Statistics Aren’t Capturing, THE ATLANTIC 
(July 27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/07/paygap-
discrimination/492965/ [https://perma.cc/8E2Q-BJAZ]. 
25 Id. (“Pay-gap skeptics often note that the gap shrinks after taking these factors into 
account, but it’s supposed to—those statistical adjustments were intended to create a more 
definitive, standardized measurement.”); see also America’s Women and the Wage Gap: 
Fact Sheet, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN & FAMILIES 2–3 (May 2019), 
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workplace-fairness/fair-pay/americas-
women-and-the-wage-gap.pdf [https://perma.cc/S2HG-V8K6].  
26 Kate Nielson, The Gender Pay Gap by State: An Interactive Map, AM. ASS’N OF U. 
WOMEN (2018), https://www.aauw.org/resource/gender-pay-gap-by-state-and-
congressional-district/ [https://perma.cc/4ULF-TESP].  
27 See Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, Shattering the Equal Pay Act’s Glass Ceiling, 63 
S.M.U. L. REV. 17, 23–28 (2010) (analyzing studies concerning the wage gap and women in 
different professions); see also Bourree Lam, Why Does Progress on Women’s Wages Seem 
to be Stalling?, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/arc 
hive/2015/11/gender-gap-women-wages-2015/415884/ [https://perma.cc/8E2Q-BJAZ] 
(listing theories as to why progress on the wage gap is stalling and presenting potential 
solutions to close it). 
28 Women’s Median Earnings as a Percent of Men’s Median Earnings 1960–2017, 
INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (Sept. 12, 2018), https://iwpr.org/publications/pay-equity-
projection-1960-2017/ [https://perma.cc/8E2Q-BJAZ]. This date only accounts for women 
on average. For race-specific dates as to when the wage gap will close, see Pay Equity & 
Discrimination, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (2018), https://iwpr.org/issue/employment-
education-economic-change/pay-equity-discrimination/ [https://perma.cc/T8LV-LL4K]. 
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future, discussed further in Part IV. Nonetheless, before looking to the future, it is 
important to consider the past, including the procedure, passage, and development 
of the EPA, in an effort to understand how it can further evolve. 
 
III.  THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963 
 
A.  Procedure 
 
Congress has enacted two key pieces of remedial legislation in response to the 
wage gap: the Equal Pay Act of 196329 and Title VII of the Equal Rights Act of 
1964.30 Both share certain similarities and are subject to enforcement by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal agency responsible for 
“enforcing federal laws that make it illegal to discriminate against a job 
applicant . . . .”31 However, Title VII is broader in scope as it encompasses race, 
color, national origin, and religion, as well as sex.32 It also prohibits multiple types 
of discriminatory practices in the workplace, including wage discrimination, based 
on any of the listed factors.33 The EPA, in contrast, exclusively applies to sex-based 
wage discrimination that employers perpetuate between male and female coworkers 
in the same workplace.34 Title VII also generally only applies to employers with 15 
or more employees while the EPA applies to “[v]irtually all employers.”35 
Additionally, Title VII requires certain procedures distinct from the EPA. For 
example, a Title VII plaintiff must first file a charge with the EEOC and receive a 
Notice of Right to Sue before a lawsuit in either state or federal court can 
commence.36 In contrast, an EPA plaintiff can go directly to court without involving 
                                               
29 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012); see also Facts About Equal Pay and Compensation 
Discrimination, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-epa.cfm [https://perma. 
cc/R7L2-Y9ZD] (last visited October 17, 2018). 
31 Overview, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/index.cfm [https://perma.cc/8633-
5DQT] (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). 
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–§ 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
33 Id.  
34 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
35 Coverage of Business/Private Employers, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employers 
/coverage_private.cfm [https://perma.cc/6KRJ-UD8C] (last visited June 23, 2019); see also 
Know Your Rights: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, AM. ASS’N OF U. WOMEN, 
https://www.aauw.org/what-we-do/legal-resources/know-your-rights-at-work/title-vii/ 
[https://perma.cc/5L6D-MEKW] (last visited June 23, 2019). 
36 Filing a Lawsuit, EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/lawsuit.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/C9ZW-PAXZ] (last visited Oct. 17, 2018). This assumes that the 
complainant is within the statute of limitations, which is another difference between Title 
VII claims and EPA claims. With Title VII claims, the complainant has 180 days from the 
time the discrimination took place (or 300 days if there is an equivalent state or local agency 
law) to file a charge and 90 days to file a lawsuit after receiving a Notice of Right to Sue. 
With EPA claims, the complainant has 2 years from receipt of the last discriminatory 
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the EEOC.37 More importantly, plaintiffs bringing Title VII claims must show that 
they were intentionally discriminated against, whereas there is no intentionality 
component to EPA claims.38 With regard to wage discrimination, the difference 
between the two statutes is essentially that the EPA “requires a plaintiff to prove that 
‘I was paid less than a comparable man and I am a woman,’ while Title VII requires 
a plaintiff to prove, even in the absence of a comparable man, that ‘I was paid less 
than I deserved because I am a woman.’”39  
Specifically, the EPA provides that: 
 
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section 
shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying 
wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at 
which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex in such 
establishment for equal work on jobs the performance of which requires 
equal skill, effort, and responsibility, and which are performed under 
similar working conditions . . . .40 
 
In an EPA claim, the employee bears the initial burden of establishing a prima 
facie case. An employee establishes a prima facie case by showing that “[1] an 
employer pays different wages to employees of opposite sexes [2] for equal work on 
jobs, [3] the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility, 
and [4] which are performed under similar working conditions.”41 The employee 
does not need to show that the employer was intentionally engaging in 
discriminatory pay practices,42 just that there is a wage differential that exists 
between the complainant and a proper comparator, i.e. a coworker of the opposite 
sex who performs “substantially equal” work.43 Once a plaintiff establishes a prima 
                                               
paycheck to file a lawsuit (or 3 years if the discrimination was willful). Often, an employee 
files a Title VII claim with an EPA claim. See Time Limits for Filing a Charge, EEOC, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (last visited June 23, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/AX6L-7WXG]. 
37 Filing a Lawsuit, supra note 36. 
38 See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (discussing Title 
VII’s burden shifting scheme); see also EEOC v. Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 120 (4th 
Cir. 2018) (discussing which party bears the ultimate burden of proof in an EPA claim). 
39 McMillan v. Mass. Soc’y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 880 F. Supp. 900, 
907 (D. Mass. 1995). Men can also sue under the EPA. See Hicks v. Concorde Career 
College, 695 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2010). 
40 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
41 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
42 Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d at 120. This is another key difference between Title VII 
and the EPA. Title VII claims require a plaintiff to show that the employer acted in an 
intentionally discriminatory manner to prevail at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., 
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 2000). 
43 29 C.F.R. § 1620.13(a) (2018) (“The equal work standard does not require that 
compared jobs be identical, only that they be substantially equal.”). 
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facie case, the burden shifts to the employer. Courts have described this burden as 
“heavy”44 because the employer “must show that the factor of sex provided no basis 
for the wage differential.”45  
Under the EPA, an employer has four affirmative defenses that will excuse a 
wage gap. The first three defenses are specific and the fourth defense is considered 
a catchall provision.46 Specifically, the EPA stipulates that: 
 
No employer . . . shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of 
sex . . . except where such payment is made pursuant to (i) a seniority 
system; (ii) a merit system; (iii) a system which measures earnings by 
quantity or quality of production; or (iv) a differential based on any other 
factor other than sex.47 
 
The EPA thus “creates a type of strict liability for employers who pay men and 
women different wages for the same work.”48 If an employer’s justification for a 
wage differential does not fall under one of the EPA’s four exceptions, the employer 
may be held liable for pay discrimination. 
 
B.  History and Intent 
 
After a complainant establishes a prima facie case, disputes often occur when 
it is not clear if an employer’s justification for a wage differential falls under one of 
the EPA’s four affirmative defenses. Because “a seniority system,”49 “a merit 
system,”50 and “a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of 
production”51 are less ambiguous in meaning and application,52 this section will 
focus on the history, intent, and interpretation of the fourth affirmative defense, 
termed a “catchall provision.” 
                                               
44 Md. Ins. Admin., 879 F.3d at 120. 
45 Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 954 (11th Cir. 1995) (emphasis in original). 
46 Corning, 417 U.S. at 196 (describing the fourth affirmative defense as a “catchall 
provision”). 
47 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
48 Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 459 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds, 139 S. 
Ct. 706 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maxwell v. City of Tucson, 803 
F.2d 444, 446 (9th Cir. 1986)). 
49 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
50 Id. 
51 Id.  
52 See Edward J. Gaffney Jr., Factors Other than Sex: The Catchall Exception to the 
Equal Pay Act, 3 COOLEY L. REV. 75, 76 (1985) (“By far the most problematic and litigated 
exception to the Equal Pay Act is the fourth or catchall exception. This exception has been 
the subject of more legal action than the three other exceptions combined.”). 
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The catchall provision is the subject of much debate due to its ambiguity.53 It 
acts as an affirmative defense if a wage differential is based on “any other factor 
other than sex.”54 Depending on how broadly or narrowly a court construes the 
catchall provision, an employer’s success in using certain ambiguous factors as 
affirmative defenses, e.g. prior salary, worth, flexibility, and future potential, can 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.55 It is therefore important to look to the history 
and intent behind the EPA’s enactment in order to understand how courts should 
interpret and apply the catchall provision.  
Congress enacted the EPA in 1963 to eliminate “one of the most persistent and 
obnoxious forms of discrimination.”56 The goal was to end the “economic 
exploitation of women workers.”57 For the majority of supporters, the EPA was not 
a ploy to preserve an unequal economic status quo.58 Instead, it was seen as “a 
starting point,”59 a way to “get a foot in the door”60 to catalyze further reform with 
the ultimate goal being wage equality between men and women in the workforce. 
The catchall provision was included in the EPA due to the impossibility of listing 
all potential, legitimate justifications for wage differentials.61 Summarizing the 
effect of the affirmative defenses, Representative Goodell stated that wage 
differentials “based upon a bona fide job classification system” would not violate 
the EPA.62 In relation to the catchall provision, Representative Griffin further 
                                               
53 See id.  
54 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). 
55 Courts agree that sex can provide no basis for determining an employee’s salary. The 
issue with the catchall provision pertains to situations where employers use ambiguous 
factors like prior salary, worth, future potential, and flexibility to set salaries, whether those 
factors are a proxy for sex, and which party has the burden of proof. See Keziah v. W.M. 
Brown & Son, Inc., 888 F.2d 322, 326 (4th Cir. 1989) (“One of the things undermining the 
company’s defense is the pure subjectivity of the salary-setting process. The salaries were 
based on nothing more than [a] subjective evaluation of [the employees’] worth. . . .”). 
56 109 CONG. REC. 9192, 9200 (1963) (statement of Rep. Dwyer). 
57 Id. at 9199 (statement of Rep. Green). The EPA can also be used by men. See, e.g., 
Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2000). 
58 The Congressional Record does reveal that some proponents may actually have had 
the idea of preserving inequality in mind as the overall outcome of the EPA. 109 CONG. REC. 
at 9205 (statement of Rep. Findley) (noting that “others are convinced [the EPA] would . . . 
cause employers to quit hiring women for some jobs and thus it would be a subtle but 
effective way to get some women out of the labor force. They support it for that reason.”). 
However, this was also a reason some people gave for not supporting the EPA. See id. at 
9193 (statement of Rep. Colmer) (noting that “employers may find it advantageous to 
employ men in positions now filled by women.”). 
59 Id. at 9202 (statement of Rep. Kelly). 
60 Id. at 9193 (statement of Rep. St. George). 
61 See id. at 9210 (noting that it would be “impossible to list each and every exception”). 
62 Id. at 9209 (statement of Rep. Goodell). 
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clarified that “[r]oman numeral iv is a broad principle, and those preceding it are 
really examples.”63  
In 1974, the Supreme Court analyzed the legislative history of the EPA and its 
four exceptions in Corning Glass Works v. Brennan.64 The Court determined that 
the EPA was enacted to “remedy what was perceived to be a serious and endemic 
problem of employment discrimination in the private industry.”65 The Act is 
“broadly remedial” and its objective was and still is “to raise women to the levels 
enjoyed by men . . . .”66 In other words, equal pay for equal work. The Court found 
that the EPA’s language and its affirmative defenses were meant to 
“incorporate . . . the well-defined and well-accepted principles of job evaluation so 
as to ensure that wage differentials based upon bona fide job evaluation plans would 
be outside the purview of the Act.”67 The Court affirmed that “a bona fide job 
classification program that does not discriminate on the basis of sex will serve as a 
valid defense to a charge of discrimination.”68 
Recently, the Ninth Circuit examined the applicability of the catchall provision 
in Rizo v. Yovino. The court looked to the doctrines of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem 
generis, principles of statutory interpretation:  
 
The canon noscitur a sociis—a word is known by the company it 
keeps—provides that words grouped together should be given related 
meaning. Here, the catchall phrase is grouped with three specific 
exceptions based on systems of seniority, merit, and productivity. These 
specific systems share more in common than mere gender neutrality; all 
three relate to job qualifications, performance, and/or experience. It 
follows that the more general exception should be limited to legitimate, 
job-related reasons as well.  
 
A related canon, ejusdem generis, likewise supports our 
interpretation of the catchall term. We apply this canon when interpreting 
general terms at the end of a list of more specific ones. In such a case, the 
general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.69 
                                               
63 109 CONG. REC. at 9203 (statement of Rep. Griffin). 
64 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 188 (1974). 
65 Id. at 195. 
66 Id. at 207–08 (quoting Rep. Dwyer) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67 Id. at 201. 
68 Id. 
69 Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 461–62 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds, 139 
S. Ct. 706 (2019) (internal citations omitted). But see Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, 
Yovino, Fresno Cty. Superintendent of Schools v. Rizo, 139 S. Ct. 706 (No. 18-272) (Aug. 
30, 2018) (interpreting the meaning of “based on” within the EPA and concluding that “based 
on” means “because of” which indicates that “a wage disparity is ‘based on’ sex only if sex 
is the reason that the employer paid male and female workers differently.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
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The above-mentioned congressional history and judicial review of the statute 
make it clear that Congress intended for the EPA to eliminate pay disparities 
between men and women. It also appears that Congress intended for the catchall 
provision to only apply to factors related to the actual job being performed. Any 
broader interpretation would allow the exception to swallow the rule: employers 
could simply maintain discriminatory wage rates through an indirect use of sex as a 
factor. This potential loophole could encompass ambiguous factors like prior salary 
that are not necessarily related to the current job being performed and are also not 
per se based on sex, but could still be sex-related.  
Although Congress did not expressly bar the use of prior salary or other 
ambiguous factors unrelated to the actual job being performed, it is difficult to 
believe that prior salary would have been viewed as a defensible “factor other than 
sex” under the catchall provision in 1963. Using a woman’s prior salary to determine 
her starting pay in 1963 would have most likely preserved the very same economic 
inequalities Congress sought to eliminate with the EPA. Consider a male and a 
female candidate in the 1960s, both transferring from the same old job where the 
employer intentionally paid women less, to the same new job where the employer 
uses prior salary to determine starting salary. The male candidate would necessarily 
receive a higher salary than his female coworker, essentially nullifying the EPA. To 
say that prior salary is a factor other than sex ignores the context of the EPA’s 
enactment. The wage gap was the impetus behind the EPA.70 The concern was equal 
work deserves equal pay. Salary and wages—prior, current, and future—are, 
arguably, an inherent part of the scheme Congress intended to remedy and, as a 
natural result, preclude from use as an affirmative defense.  
 
C.  Interpretations in Case Law 
 
The EPA is meant to be “broadly remedial,” but there are ambiguities as to its 
application.71 Corning is the main Supreme Court decision that specifically looks at 
and discusses Congress’s intent in enacting the EPA,72 but Corning was also decided 
over forty years ago and new questions have arisen pertinent to a modern workforce.  
The main problem with the “any other factor other than sex” affirmative 
defense, or catchall provision, is that different courts have different interpretations 
about what constitutes a “factor other than sex.”73 So, when employers invoke 
ambiguous factors to avoid EPA wage discrimination liability, their success depends 
                                               
70 Supra Part II. 
71 Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 207–08 (1974) (quoting Rep. 
Dwyer). 
72 See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 32 (contemplating the “relatively low number 
of appellate cases for a statute that is [over forty] years old” and how the U.S. “Supreme 
Court has interpreted the EPA only once . . . which has led to conflicting interpretations 
among the circuits . . .”). 
73 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2012). 
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on how broadly or narrowly a court interprets “any other factor other than sex.” If 
an affirmative defense applies,74 courts must defer to the employer’s justification for 
the wage differential and the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the 
employer’s justification was a pretext for sex discrimination, as stated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Washington County v. Gunther.75 But if an affirmative defense 
does not apply, if the employer’s justification for the wage differential is ambiguous, 
the burden remains with the employer to disprove any basis for sex-related 
discrimination.76 
As congressional records do not explicitly reveal the scope envisioned for the 
catchall provision, courts are split on the issue of whether or not prior salary is an 
affirmative defense as a “factor other than sex.”77 If prior salary is viewed as a 
“factor other than sex,” a plaintiff will not prevail in an EPA claim when an 
employer uses prior salary as an affirmative defense, unless the plaintiff can show 
there is a discriminatory, sex-based motive behind the wage differential. However, 
if prior salary is not viewed as a “factor other than sex,” or as having the potential 
to not be a “factor other than sex,” the burden of proof remains with the employer to 
negate any notion of sex-based discrimination.78  
                                               
74 For example, the Federal Government’s General Schedule is a classic example of a 
pay system that clearly appears to not use sex as a factor, but instead uses a discernible 
seniority- or merit-based system. Pay & Leave, U.S. OFF. OF PERSONNEL AND MGMT., 
https://www.opm.gov/policy-data-oversight/pay-leave/pay-systems/general-schedule/ 
[https://perma.cc/3TFL-U79A] (“[T]he grade of each job is based on the level of difficulty, 
responsibilities, and qualifications required.”) (last visited June 30, 2019). But this is not to 
say that a pay disparity can never arise, just that if one does, the burden will likely shift to 
the plaintiff to show discrimination. See Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 712–13 (8th Cir. 
2003). 
75 In County of Washington v. Gunther, the Supreme Court noted that “courts . . . are 
not permitted to substitute their judgment for the judgment of the employer.” 452 U.S. 161, 
171 (1981) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rep. Goodell, principal exponent of 
the EPA). Thus, so long as the employer’s justification for the wage differential 
unambiguously falls under one of the four exceptions in the EPA, courts must defer to the 
employer’s pay scheme.  
76 The Federal Circuit, however, appears to be an outlier. In Yant v. United States, the 
Federal Circuit held that an EPA plaintiff must make a prima facie showing that 
“discrimination based on sex exists or at one time existed” in addition to the statutory 
requirements required by the Equal Pay Act discussed supra Part III.A. 588 F.3d 1369, 1373 
(Fed. Cir. 2009); see also Gordon v. United States, 903 F.3d 1248, 1254, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 
2018) (vacated on other grounds) (Reyna, J., additional views) (noting that the holding in 
Yant is “at odds with Supreme Court precedent and the law of other circuits” by improperly 
“shift[ing] the burden onto the plaintiff to affirmatively prove discrimination, rather than on 
the employer to disprove discrimination” with an affirmative defense). 
77 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1); see also infra Part III.C.1–3. 
78 See generally EEOC v. Md. Insurance Admin., 879 F.3d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(discussing which party bears the ultimate burden of proof in an EPA claim). 
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As detailed below, courts take approximately three views as to whether prior 
salary falls under the catchall provision: (1) prior salary is not a “factor other than 
sex”; (2) prior salary is a “factor other than sex”; and (3) prior salary alone is not a 
“factor other than sex,” but when considered with other factors, it could be a “factor 
other than sex.” These views are relevant to how easily an employer’s burden of 
proof is satisfied and thereby the likelihood of a plaintiff’s success in an EPA claim. 
 
1.  Prior salary is not a factor other than sex and is not an affirmative defense in 
EPA claims 
 
In Rizo v. Yovino, a female math consultant sued the school district in which 
she taught, alleging an EPA violation.79 One day during lunch, Aileen Rizo learned 
that her salary was about 20% less than a recently hired male math consultant with 
less experience, performing the same work as her.80 The plaintiff’s initial salary was 
determined based entirely on her prior salary, plus a 5% raise.81 The employer sought 
to use this pay scheme as an affirmative defense under the catchall provision, 
maintaining that the use of prior salary to determine starting salary was a legitimate 
and gender-neutral business policy.82  
The Ninth Circuit held as a matter of law that “prior salary does not constitute 
a factor other than sex” 83 and that “prior salary alone or in combination with other 
factors cannot justify a wage differential.”84 The court reasoned that “to hold 
otherwise [would be] to allow employers to capitalize on the persistence of the wage 
gap and perpetuate that gap ad infinitum . . . .”85 The court found it “inconceivable” 
that Congress intended prior salary to be a “factor other than sex” under the catchall 
provision since the EPA was enacted to remedy the problem of discriminatory 
salaries.86 Prior salary is simply a proxy, “a second-rate surrogate that likely masks 
continuing inequalities” with an “attenuated” relationship to legitimate factors like 
                                               
79 Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 458 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other grounds, 139 S. 
Ct. 706 (2019). 
80 Id.; Yuki Noguchi, Proposals Aim to Combat Discrimination Based on Salary 
History, NPR (May 30, 2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/05/30/528794176/proposals-aim-
to-combat-discrimination-based-on-salary-history [https://perma.cc/W4PK-ELZM]. 
81 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 457. Aileen Rizo transferred from a job in Arizona, meaning that 
Fresno County School District in California had no hand in determining the salary on which 
it based Rizo’s starting pay apart from adding 5%. Bill Chappell, Women Can’t Have Prior 
Salaries Used Against Them, Court Says in Equal Pay Case, NPR (Apr. 10, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/04/10/601096889/women-cant-have-prior-
salaries-used-against-them-court-says-in-equal-pay-case [https://perma.cc/VZ2N-93JD]. 
82 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 458. 
83 Id. at 457. 
84 Id. at 456.  
85 Id. at 456–57. 
86 Id. at 460. 
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training, experience, or education.87 The Ninth Circuit is the only court that has taken 
the position that prior salary is a sex-related factor within the scope of the EPA, 
providing no defense to employers.88  
 
2.  Prior salary is a factor other than sex and acts as an affirmative defense in 
EPA claims 
 
In Wernsing v. Dept. of Human Services,89 a female employee sued the 
Department of Human Services in Illinois alleging an EPA violation. The 
Department had a policy of determining salary for lateral candidates based on their 
prior salary and raising it according to experience and years of service.90 As a result 
of this policy, the plaintiff and her male comparator did the same work for different 
pay. The plaintiff’s starting monthly salary was $2,478, whereas her comparator’s 
was $3,739 simply because his prior job had paid more.91 As raises in the 
Department were uniform at 10%, the differential would be preserved despite any 
efforts the plaintiff could make.92  
The Seventh Circuit ultimately held that “wages at one’s prior employer are a 
factor other than sex.”93 The use of prior salary is simply “a common personnel-
management practice.”94 To prevail in an EPA claim, an employer only needs “a 
factor other than sex—not . . . a ‘good’ reason.”95 The court did acknowledge that 
“wage patterns in some lines of work could be discriminatory, but [that] is something 
to be proved rather than assumed.”96  
The Eighth Circuit holds a similar view.97 In Taylor v. White,98 a female Army 
employee sued under the EPA alleging unequal pay. The pay differential arose when 
the plaintiff was transferred to a new project and she retained the pay grade from her 
prior position.99 Two men were also transferred to the project, and they also retained 
their higher pay grades from their prior positions.100 Thus, although the plaintiff and 
                                               
87 Id. at 467. 
88 See infra Part III.C.2–3. 
89 Wernsing v. Dep’t. of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466 (7th Cir. 2005). 
90 Id. at 467. 
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 468 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
94 Id. at 467. 
95 Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 468. 
96 Id. at 470. 
97 See id. (noting that the Seventh Circuit’s position has the support of the Eighth 
Circuit). 
98 321 F.3d 710 (8th Cir. 2003). 
99 Id. at 712. 
100 Id. at 713. 
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her two male coworkers were performing equivalent work on the project, the 
plaintiff was doing so for less pay.101  
The Eighth Circuit “refused to adopt a per se rule that would exclude salary 
retention or past salary as qualifying ‘factors other than sex.’”102 Rather, an 
employer’s use of prior salary is examined on a case-by-case basis, with the burden 
on the employee to disprove the employer’s claim of gender-neutrality.103 A showing 
of mere uncertainty is not enough for the plaintiff to prevail.104 
In both the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, once a plaintiff establishes a prima 
facie case, “all the employer need do is articulate a ground of decision that avoids 
reliance on the forbidden grounds. The plaintiff then bears the burden to show that 
the stated reason is a pretext for a decision really made on prohibited criteria.”105 So 
long as the employer is not openly relying on sex as a factor, the burden shifts back 
to the plaintiff to show that there was a discriminatory pretext. This is because, under 
Washington County v. Gunther, courts must defer to the employer’s pay scheme 
when a wage differential can be explained by one of the four exceptions listed in the 
EPA.106 Such a broad interpretation of the catchall provision makes it very difficult 
for plaintiffs to prevail, which also likely deters employees from pursuing an EPA 
claim in the first place.107   
 
3.  Prior salary alone is not a factor other than sex and is not an affirmative 
defense in EPA claims, but when prior salary is considered with other factors, it 
may support an affirmative defense in EPA claims 
 
In Glenn v. General Motors,108 three female employees who worked for 
General Motors (GM) sued pursuant to an EPA violation. All three women made 
less than the lowest-paid male employee performing substantially equal work, and 
all three had received lower starting salaries than their male comparators who were 
hired around the same time.109 GM argued that the men were paid more because they 
all had higher prior salaries.110  
                                               
101 Id. at 713–15. 
102 Id. at 719. 
103 Id. 
104 Taylor, 321 F.3d at 721. 
105 Wernsing, 427 F.3d at 469; Taylor, 321 F.3d at 719. 
106 Cty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 171 (1981). 
107 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 33–35; see also Nathan Koppel, Job-Discrimination 
Cases Tend to Fare Poorly in Federal Court, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 19, 2009), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123500883048618747 [https://perma.cc/5LCZ-VW9F]. 
108 Glenn v. General Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988). 
109 Id. at 1569. 
110 Id. at 1570. 
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The Eleventh Circuit ultimately held that “prior salary alone cannot justify pay 
disparity.”111 As the Eleventh Circuit later noted in Irby v. Bittick,112 employers have 
no defense if they only rely on an employee’s prior salary to determine starting pay, 
but “there is no prohibition on utilizing prior pay as part of a mixed-motive, such as 
prior pay and more experience” when setting initial wages.113 That is, as explained 
in Glenn, prior salary can support an affirmative defense under the catchall provision 
when it is considered in tandem with “unique characteristics of the job,” “an 
individual’s experience, training, or ability,” or “special exigent circumstances 
connected with the business.”114 So, once a plaintiff “establish[es] a prima facie case, 
the burden shift[s] to [the employer] to prove that the difference in pay was justified 
by one of the four exceptions in the Equal Pay Act . . . .”115 If the employer used 
prior salary, the employer must show that it was part of a permissible “mixed 
motive” scheme for setting pay.116 As GM made no such assertion in Glenn, GM 
was not able to meet its burden by relying solely on prior salary.117  
This interpretation is shared by the Sixth Circuit,118 the Tenth Circuit,119 the 
EEOC by way of its compliance manual,120 and four of the five concurring judges 
                                               
111 Id. at 1571. The Ninth Circuit maintained an analogous position in Kouba v. Allstate 
Ins. Co, before Rizo v. Yovino was decided. See Kouba v. Allstate Ins. Co., 691 F.2d 873, 
878 (9th Cir. 1982). Rizo expressly overruled Kouba. Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 468 (9th 
Cir. 2018). 
112 44 F.3d 949 (11th Cir. 1995). 
113 Id. at 955. 
114 Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571. 
115 Id. at 1569. 
116 Irby, 44 F.3d at 955.  
117 Glenn, 841 F.2d at 1571. 
118 See Hicks v. Concorde Career College, 695 F. Supp. 2d 779, 790 (W.D. Tenn. 2010), 
aff’d, 449 F. App’x 484 (6th Cir. 2011) (“A new employee’s prior salary also constitutes a 
factor other than sex as long as the employer does not rely solely on prior salary to justify a 
pay disparity.”). 
119 See Riser v. QEP Energy, 776 F.3d 1191, 1199 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that “the 
EPA precludes an employer from relying solely upon a prior salary to justify pay disparity.” 
(internal citations omitted)). 
120 See EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA), Interpretative Manual, Vol. 2, Sec. 10-IV(F)(2) 
(“An employer asserting a ‘factor other than sex’ defense also must show that the factor is 
related to job requirements or otherwise is beneficial to the employer’s business.”); see also 
Brief for the EEOC as Amicus Curiae Supporting Rehearing En Banc, Rizo v. Yovino, 887 
F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (Civ. No. 14-cv-4932 (AWI-MJS) (discussing an employer’s burden 
of proof). It is unclear whether the EEOC believes the Ninth Circuit went too far in 
classifying prior salary as a per se sex-related factor, or whether they support that decision. 
Oral arguments tended to show a noncommittal attitude about the EEOC’s overall position. 
See Oral Argument of EEOC at 00:54:55, Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 
16-15372), https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/media/view_video.php?pk_vid=0000012817 
[https://perma.cc/5TPA-7D3Z] (questioning the EEOC’s position concerning prior salary in 
EPA claims). 
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in Rizo.121 The idea is that “employers do not necessarily violate the Equal Pay Act 
when they consider prior salary among other factors when setting initial wages.”122 
Within this construal, employers in EPA claims cannot rely solely on prior salary 
and, moreover, it remains the employer’s burden to show that its use of prior salary 
was permissible, even when using other factors, due to its potential sex-related 
origins.   
Relatedly, some courts that have not yet addressed the issue of prior salary 
uphold a comparable interpretation. For example, in Aldrich v. Randolph Central 
School District,123 a female employee filed an EPA claim alleging sex-based wage 
discrimination. The plaintiff was hired as a “cleaner” and was paid less than her male 
“custodian” coworkers despite performing substantially similar duties.124 The 
employer invoked the catchall provision as an affirmative defense but did not specify 
that prior salary had been a factor in setting wages. Rather, the employer justified 
the wage differential on the basis that the higher salary went to “custodians,” who 
happened to be male, because that job entailed ranking third or higher on a civil 
service exam, distinct from being a “cleaner” which demanded no such 
prerequisite.125  
The Second Circuit in Aldrich held that “an employer bears the burden of 
proving that a bona fide business-related reason exists for using the gender-neutral 
factor that results in a wage differential in order to establish the factor-other-than-
sex defense.”126 This view that the catchall provision encompasses a business or job-
related factor is held by federal courts that have specifically considered the question 
of prior salary, as well as those that have not yet addressed that question.127 Thus, 
for the Second Circuit, unlike the Seventh Circuit, an employer’s use of prior salary 
would not seem to automatically shift the burden to the plaintiff to show a 
discriminatory motive for the wage differential. The burden would remain with the 
employer to disprove any possibility of discrimination. However, unlike the 
Eleventh Circuit, the Second Circuit may not require the presence of other factors if 
                                               
121 See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 468–78 (McKeown, Callahan, Tallman, & Murguia, JJ., 
concurring).  
122 Id. at 469 (McKeown, J., concurring). 
123 963 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992). 
124 Id. at 522–23. 
125 Id. at 523–24. 
126 Id. at 526 (emphasis added). 
127 See, e.g., Dubowsky v. Stern, Lavinthal, Norgaard, & Daly, 922 F. Supp. 985, 990 
(D.N.J. 1996) (“Acceptable factors other than sex include education, experience, prior salary, 
or any other factor related to performance of the job.”); see also Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 525 
(“Congress intended for a job classification system to serve as a factor-other-than-sex 
defense to sex-based wage discrimination claims only when the employer proves that the job 
classification system resulting in differential pay is rooted in legitimate business-related 
differences in work responsibilities and qualifications for the particular positions at issue.”). 
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the use of prior salary could be proven to be job-related on its own merits.128 In the 
Second Circuit, an employer must prove that it used legitimate job-related factors.129 
 
D.  The EPA Today 
 
The EPA is stringent, requiring plaintiffs to establish that they have been paid 
less than a coworker of the opposite sex performing substantially equal work.130 
Studies show that courts are increasingly granting summary judgment to employers 
at the prima facie stage.131 Moreover, in certain industries today, like education and 
athletics, it is becoming increasingly difficult to establish a prima facie case due to 
an employer’s ability to manipulate potential comparators by way of flexible job 
duties and descriptions.132 As a result, scholars have suggested that the EPA is 
nothing more than an “empty promise,”133 an idealistic piece of legislation, but 
ultimately unrealistic and impractical to pursue.134  
Nonetheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended 
the EPA to be “broadly remedial.”135 To further that legislative intent, the EPA 
should be adapted to suit a modern workforce and prevailing economic practices. 
Adopting a uniform bar on prior salary as an affirmative defense, as in Rizo, has the 
potential to encourage further reform to attain the goal of equal pay for equal work. 
Ideally, such a bar would be implemented by Congress to avoid the piecemeal 
interpretations and applications seen today.136 However, this Note maintains that any 
action is better than no action. 
 
IV.  CATALYZING EQUAL PAY REFORM 
 
Congress enacted the EPA to remedy the wage gap between women and men 
by “requir[ing] that . . . depressed wages be raised.”137 As the Supreme Court stated 
in Corning, “[t]he Equal Pay Act is broadly remedial, and it should be construed and 
applied so as to fulfill the underlying purposes which Congress sought to 
                                               
128 See Aldrich, 963 F.2d at 526. 
129 Id. 
130 See Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195 (1974). 
131 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 33–34. 
132 See id. at 38; see also Laura Woodworth Keohane, Universities, Colleges and the 
Equal Pay Act: The Fourth Circuit Analyzes a Salary Dispute in Strag v. Board of Trustees, 
19 CAMPBELL L. REV. 333, 347 (1997). 
133 Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 22. 
134 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 658 (2007), 
superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 
(2009) (noting that plaintiff abandoned her EPA claim on appeal). 
135 Corning, 417 U.S. at 207–08. 
136 See infra Part III.C. 
137 Corning, 417 U.S. at 207. 
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achieve.”138 As demonstrated in the discussion above, allowing employers to use 
prior salary as an affirmative defense in EPA wage discrimination claims works to 
entrench the remnants of discrimination in the economy, even when there is no 
discriminatory motive. This Note argues for the elimination of the wage gap between 
male and female workers, best achieved by altering routine practices to address the 
actual problem, not by focusing on an employer’s intent and deferring to an unequal 
status quo. 
While the EPA has clearly left a gap at the federal statute level, states and cities 
have started to take independent action to promote wage equality. For example, 
certain states and cities have enacted legislation affecting an employer’s ability to 
use prior salary in hiring, or more broadly, limiting the potential defenses an 
employer may use in wage discrimination claims, though not necessarily precluding 
prior salary’s use as a defense.139 For example, in Chamber of Commerce v. 
Philadelphia,140 the City of Philadelphia enacted a wage equity ordinance which (1) 
prohibited employers from asking about a prospective employee’s salary history and 
(2) prohibited employers from relying on salary history to determine an employee’s 
salary.141 The Chamber of Commerce sued the City and moved for a preliminary 
injunction. The district court concluded that the first provision was an 
unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment’s free speech clause and granted 
the Chamber’s motion.142 The court denied the preliminary injunction for the second 
provision, concluding that it was within constitutional bounds.143  
As the district court said, the City’s efforts were laudable.144 Philadelphia, 
however, shows that there is opposition to reform and there can be roadblocks in 
attaining pay equity. Moreover, independent efforts by states and cities are not 
something to depend or rely on to eliminate the wage gap. Even before the EPA was 
adopted in 1963, states had started to take matters into their own hands, enacting 
laws requiring equal pay for equal work.145 Congress, however, was unimpressed. 
Representative Sickles explained, “We cannot rely on the States to take care of the 
problem of unequal pay practices since only 23 States have equal pay laws.”146 He 
also noted that state laws were “spotty in their coverage” and “not very effective in 
                                               
138 Id. at 209. 
139 See Kate Nielson, AAUW Policy Guide to Equal Pay in the States, AM. ASS’N OF U. 
WOMEN, https://www.aauw.org/resource/state-equal-pay-laws/ [https://perma.cc/D793-
QTCZ] (last visited July 3, 2019) [hereinafter Nielson, Policy Guide]. 
140 Chamber of Commerce v. City of Philadelphia, 319 F. Supp. 3d. 773 (E.D. Pa. 2018) 
(order granting preliminary injunction), appeal docketed, No. 18-2175, (3d Cir. May 30, 
2018). 
141 Id. at 779. 
142 Id. 
143 Id.  
144 Id.  
145 109 CONG. REC. 9192, 9205 (1963). 
146 Id. (statement of Rep. Sickles). 
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their terms or enforcement.”147 State action was and remains too sporadic and too 
scattered, with results that are too uneven.148  
At the same time, some action is better than no action. Even though current 
state and city legislative efforts could be termed “spotty,” a continuation of such 
action could also eventually spur Congress to act. Ultimately, achieving equal pay 
for equal work will require uniform, nationwide action that is easily enforced and 
unambiguous. But in the meantime, while Congress fails to act, state action and even 
action by the courts can be an effective means to reduce the wage gap, as exemplified 
by the Ninth Circuit’s decision to preclude prior salary as an affirmative defense in 
EPA claims. Such small, focused steps with the potential for others to follow can be 
more effective than giant reformative leaps that may leave others behind. 
Although a minority position, the Ninth Circuit’s decision that prior salary is 
not a job-related factor and does not excuse a wage gap is the correct decision if 
wage equality is to be achieved. The overall effect of this decision is narrow: it only 
applies to sex-based wage discrimination claims.149 Moreover, prior salary only 
becomes an issue when an employee brings an EPA claim and establishes a prima 
facie case. Under Rizo, employers are not barred from considering an applicant’s 
salary history, nor are applicants precluded from using their prior salaries to 
negotiate. Rather, if there is a wage differential and an employee brings an EPA 
claim, the employer bears the risk of having used prior salary as a factor. This is 
appropriate because employers are better able than their employees to ensure that 
their wages do not promote wage differentials.150 Employees likely do not know 
what their coworkers make. “Compensation disparities . . . are often hidden from 
sight. It is not unusual . . . for management to decline to publish employee pay levels, 
or for employees to keep private their own salaries.”151 Employers thus have the 
ability and flexibility to use their own legitimate factors without any unknown 
discriminatory taint to set salaries.152 Barring the use of prior salary as an affirmative 
defense does not create any affirmative duty on the part of the employer to close the 
wage gap by paying all employees equally regardless of other legitimate job-related 
                                               
147 Id. 
148 See Nielson, Policy Guide, supra note 139. 
149 Title VII claims as well as EPA claims would likely be affected since the four 
affirmative defenses contained in the EPA were made applicable to Title VII by the Bennett 
Amendment. See Cty. of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 167 (1981) (holding that the 
Bennett Amendment “was designed to incorporate the four affirmative defenses of the Equal 
Pay Act into Title VII for sex-based wage discrimination claims.”). 
150 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 63–64. 
151 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 649–50 (2007) (Ginsburg, 
J., dissenting). 
152 The best solution would be for businesses to be transparent about what they pay their 
employees or how they value their positions. See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 66 (opining 
that pay secrecy hinders wage equity progress and that “sunshine is the best disinfectant” 
(citing United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (quoting Justice 
Brandeis))). 
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factors like education or experience. Rather, it simply creates a risk that employers 
are better able to bear than employees. Essentially, employers should not need to use 
prior salary to determine an employee’s starting pay, as employers should already 
know what they are paying their current employees in the same, or substantially 
similar, positions. 
Unfortunately, consideration of a potential employee’s prior salary is a 
longstanding and accepted business practice.153 The reality is that “[p]rior salary is 
a prominent consideration for both a job applicant and the potential employer. The 
applicant presumably seeks a job that will pay her more and the potential employer 
recognizes that it will have to pay her more if it wants to hire her.”154 Prior salary is 
viewed as a proxy for other legitimate job-related factors. Recognizing this, the 
Seventh Circuit and Eighth Circuit have chosen to defer to employers because they 
posit that prior salary is not expressly sex-based and thus has some legitimate 
basis.155 But this shortcut is risky. The supposed link between prior salary and 
legitimate factors like education and experience is misleading.156 Prior salary is 
ultimately some third-party’s determination of an employee’s worth. It is subjective, 
and subjective factors leave room for sex-related bias.157 To eliminate the wage gap, 
employers need to start examining and, in certain instances, eliminate their use of 
subjective factors like prior salary.158  
Similar to the Seventh and Eighth Circuits, the Eleventh Circuit maintains that 
as long as prior salary is considered alongside other legitimate factors, there is a 
rebuttable presumption that the employer’s pay scheme is not sex-based.159 The 
Eleventh Circuit’s concern is that if prior salary is deemed categorically 
discriminatory and an employer uses it to determine an employee’s pay, the overall 
effect would be too harsh: the employer would be liable regardless of its 
consideration of other legitimate factors like prior experience or education.160  
Even if prior salary is a legitimate job-related factor unrelated to sex, the risk 
of perpetuating discrimination remains. Women were historically discriminated 
against in the workplace on the basis of sex. They were hired at lower wages because 
                                               
153 See Rizo v. Yovino, 887 F.3d 453, 472 (9th Cir. 2018), vacated on other 
grounds, 139 S. Ct. 706 (2019) (McKeown, J., concurring) (“In the real world, an employer 
relies on prior salary to set initial wages.”).  
154 Id. at 473 (Callahan, J., concurring). 
155 See Wernsing v. Dep’t. of Human Services, 427 F.3d 466, 467–68 (7th Cir. 2005); 
see also Taylor v. White, 321 F.3d 710, 719 (8th Cir. 2003). 
156 See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 467. 
157 See Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 50. 
158 Factors like past performance and prior experience can be legitimate considerations 
for setting salary as they can more likely be objectively corroborated, but other factors like 
prior salary, future potential, flexibility, and worth can easily leave room for bias to color 
wage determinations due to their more subjective nature.  
159 Irby v. Bittick, 44 F.3d 949, 955–56 (11th Cir. 1995). 
160 Rizo, 887 F.3d at 477 (Callahan, J., concurring). 
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that is what employers offered.161 A wage gap did result and it still exists today.162 
To say that prior salary is a defensible “factor other than sex,” or even that it can 
become defensible if considered with other factors, trivializes history and distorts 
the legislative intent behind the EPA. As the Ninth Circuit correctly recognized, 
prior salary is a sex-related factor precisely because of the sex-based discrimination 
that created the wage gap.163 Moreover, because it is practically impossible to know 
whether an individual’s prior salary was ever initially discriminatory, it is better to 
err on the side of caution rather than risk institutionalizing the very same sex-based 
discrimination Congress sought to eliminate with the EPA. This can be done by 
precluding the use of prior salary as an affirmative defense—a significant and much-
needed step forward in attaining wage equality.  
Although it is important for employers to have flexibility and freedom in their 
hiring practices, this freedom does not necessarily extend to allowing employers to 
use someone else’s determination of a new hire’s salary to set starting pay. In 
response to the Eleventh Circuit’s view, the Ninth Circuit aptly questioned “how 
what is impermissible alone somehow becomes permissible when joined with other 
factors.”164 Allowing prior salary to only be used as a defense if other legitimate 
factors are also considered is “distinction without reason.”165 It is akin to saying that 
marijuana by itself is illegal, but marijuana edibles are legal because there are some 
extra, valid ingredients. The Eleventh Circuit’s supposed compromise between two 
bright-line rules merely enlarges a loophole through which employers may 
maneuver when they perpetuate a wage gap.  
As the Ninth Circuit recognized, the wage gap is not some “inert historical relic 
of bygone assumptions and sex-based oppression.”166 It remains a reality, with the 
average woman earning 18% less than what the average man earns.167 There have 
been varying levels of response to this issue. Some states and a few cities have taken 
independent action aimed at closing the wage gap.168 There is pending legislation in 
                                               
161 109 CONG. REC. 9192, 9199 (1963) (Statement of Rep. Green) (citing studies in 
which “employers . . . said they had a double standard pay scale for men and women . . . with 
the wage for women always the lower.”). 
162 See BLS HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 17, at 1–2. 
163 See Rizo, 887 F.3d at 460. 
164 Id. at 468. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 BLS HIGHLIGHTS, supra note 17, at 1–2. It is also important to note that the wage 
gap varies based on race and ethnicity. For example, the wage gap between black women 
and black men in 2017 was 9%, whereas the wage gap between black women and white, 
non-Hispanic men in 2017 was 32%. Id. at 4, 10; see also Ariane Hegewisch & Heidi 
Hartmann, The Gender Wage Gap: 2018 Earnings Differences by Race and Ethnicity, Table 
1, INST. FOR WOMEN’S POL’Y RES. (Mar. 7, 2019), https://iwpr.org/publications/gender-
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168 See Nielson, Policy Guide, supra note 139. 
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Congress.169 The Ninth Circuit has held that employers may not use prior salary as 
an affirmative defense in EPA claims.170 There are also grassroots movements that 
aim to promote economic equality between men and women.171 All of these actions, 
although not uniform in impact, still contribute to the goal of closing the wage gap 
and more importantly, can inspire further action with the potential for widespread, 
uniform effects. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
There is a longstanding history of discrimination against women in the 
workplace and, because of that, prior salary is an intrinsically sex-related factor. An 
employer’s use of prior salary, even when seemingly neutral, still encompasses a 
determination of worth by a third-party that risks perpetuating discrimination both 
directly and indirectly due to that history. Justifying a wage gap on the basis of prior 
salary institutionalizes the very sex-based discrimination that Congress sought to 
eliminate over 55 years ago. As Aileen Rizo stated, “low wages will follow you 
wherever you go as long as someone keeps asking you how much you were paid.”172 
The Equal Pay Act of 1963 gave pay equality a proverbial foot in the door173 and the 
Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rizo v. Yovino was another step forward, important in 
drawing attention to and furthering the goal of equal pay for equal work. To continue 
building on this important progress, action needs to be taken, whether by Congress, 
courts, or state legislatures, because ultimately, prior salary should not determine 
future salary and thus, should not be construed as a defensible “factor other than 
sex”174 within the EPA. 
                                               
169 See Paycheck Fairness Act, H.R. 1869, S. 819, 115th Cong. §3 (2017); see also Pay 
Equity for All Act of 2019, H.R. 1864, 116th Cong. §8 (2019). 
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